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Abstract
Background: The endgame for polio eradication involves coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine
(OPV) with cessation of serotype 2 OPV (OPV2 cessation) implemented in late April and early May 2016 and
cessation of serotypes 1 and 3 OPV (OPV13 cessation) currently planned for after 2018. The logistics associated with
globally switching all use of trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) represent a significant undertaking, which
may cause some complications, including delays that lead to different timing of the switch across shared borders.
Methods: Building on an integrated global model for long-term poliovirus risk management, we consider the expected
vulnerability of different populations to transmission of OPV2-related polioviruses as a function of time following the
switch. We explore the relationship between the net reproduction number (Rn) of OPV2 at the time of the switch and the
time until OPV2-related viruses imported from countries still using OPV2 can establish transmission. We also analyze some
specific situations modeled after populations at high potential risk of circulating serotype 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus
(cVDPV2) outbreaks in the event of a non-synchronous switch.
Results: Well-implemented tOPV immunization activities prior to the tOPV to bOPV switch (i.e., tOPV intensification
sufficient to prevent the creation of indigenous cVDPV2 outbreaks) lead to sufficient population immunity to transmission
to cause die-out of any imported OPV2-related viruses for over 6 months after the switch in all populations in the global
model. Higher Rn of OPV2 at the time of the switch reduces the time until imported OPV2-related viruses can establish
transmission and increases the time during which indigenous OPV2-related viruses circulate. Modeling specific connected
populations suggests a relatively low vulnerability to importations of OPV2-related viruses that could establish
transmission in the context of a non-synchronous switch from tOPV to bOPV, unless the gap between switch times
becomes very long (>6 months) or a high risk of indigenous cVDPV2s already exists in the importing and/or the
exporting population.
Conclusions: Short national discrepancies in the timing of the tOPV to bOPV switch will likely not significantly increase
cVDPV2 risks due to the insurance provided by tOPV intensification efforts, although the goal to coordinate national
switches within the globally agreed April 17-May 1, 2016 time window minimized the risks associated with cross-border
importations.
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Background
The polio endgame includes the coordinated global ces-
sation of use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), with the
cessation of use of serotype 2 OPV (OPV2) currently
planned for April 17-May 1, 2016. The cessation of use
of OPV2 will take the form of the synchronized replace-
ment of trivalent OPV (tOPV), which contains attenu-
ated poliovirus serotypes 1, 2, and 3, with bivalent OPV
(bOPV), which contains only attenuated poliovirus sero-
types 1 and 3 [1, 2]. A successful switch from tOPV to
bOPV (the switch) will help pave the way for the coordi-
nated global cessation of use of OPV serotypes 1 and 3
(OPV13 cessation) following the global certification of
the eradication of serotypes 1 and 3 wild poliovirus
(WPV). The attenuated polioviruses in OPV mutate
when they replicate and over time can develop into cir-
culating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) that be-
have like wild polioviruses (WPVs) with respect to
transmissibility and their ability to cause paralysis. Al-
though ending the use of a given OPV serotype will end
the introduction of new OPV viruses of the serotype that
could evolve to cVDPVs, some risk exists of cVDPV out-
breaks after OPV cessation due to continued propaga-
tion and evolution of OPV-related viruses of the
serotype already present in the population as population
immunity to transmission with that poliovirus serotype
declines [3]. Current efforts to prevent serotype 2
cVDPV (cVDPV2) cases from occurring after the switch
include increased use of tOPV in supplemental
immunization activities (SIAs) in the run up to the
switch to increase population immunity to serotype 2
transmission (i.e., tOPV intensification [4, 5]), prepared-
ness for continued surveillance and outbreak response in
the event of detection of OPV2-related virus circulation
after the switch, [6, 7] introduction of inactivated polio-
virus vaccine (IPV) into routine immunization (RI) pro-
grams, and plans for tight synchronization of the switch
within and between countries [8].
Previous modeling provided insights about the import-
ance of efforts to prevent cVDPV2 cases after the switch.
An integrated global model for long-term poliovirus risk
management (i.e., the global model) [4] suggests that
well-implemented tOPV intensification will prevent
creation of indigenous cVDPV2s after a globally-
coordinated switch in April 2016. The global model also
indicates that failure to implement tOPV intensification
(e.g., through continued reliance on bOPV for most SIAs
in high-risk populations prior to the switch) will lead to
cVDPV2 outbreaks after the switch. If cVDPV outbreaks
of any serotype occur, aggressive outbreak response with
monovalent OPV (mOPV) can potentially control any
virus re-introductions that might occur during the first
5 years after OPV cessation of that serotype in develop-
ing countries, although mOPV use for outbreak response
beyond approximately 5 years after homotypic OPV ces-
sation comes with challenges because it may create new
risks [4, 7]. Fortunately, the risk of poliovirus reintroduc-
tions occurring 5 or more years after complete cessation
of OPV (e.g., containment failures, immunodeficiency-
associated vaccine-derived polioviruses (iVDPVs)) should
primarily affect relatively higher-income countries that
can control outbreaks with IPV [4, 7]. Consequently, a
global analysis assuming well-implemented tOPV in-
tensification, well-coordinated OPV2 and OPV13 cessa-
tion, and aggressive outbreak response with mOPV
(while available and allowable) or IPV (long-term) sug-
gested a low risk of uncontrolled outbreaks for a strategy
of OPV cessation followed by 5 years of global IPV use.
Such a policy would lead to expected incremental net
benefits during 2013–2052 of approximately $15 billion
(2013 net present value and 2013 US dollars) compared
to continued OPV use through 2052 [4]. Thus, it is pos-
sible to plan and implement tOPV intensification for
most or all places that need SIAs to boost population
immunity to serotype 2 polioviruses and establish a suf-
ficiently large mOPV stockpile to enable aggressive out-
break response if needed using mOPV [7]. However,
questions remain regarding the logistics and effective-
ness of implementing the planned tightly-synchronized,
globally-coordinated switch from tOPV to bOPV involv-
ing 156 OPV-using countries, including some countries
affected by civil disorder, natural disasters, and/or other
disruptions [8].
The rapidly approaching switch and subsequent
OPV13 cessation represent huge global operations that
require unprecedented coordination of immunization
programs between and within countries. For example,
the need to intensify tOPV use in SIAs in high-risk areas
at the same time that vaccine manufacturers prepare to
stop tOPV production in anticipation of the switch re-
quires careful management of vaccine supplies. Under-
estimation of tOPV needs or misallocation of tOPV
could create a tOPV shortage in some countries, [5]
which in turn could lead those countries to stop using
tOPV before the planned global switch in April 2016.
For example, if global health leaders had decided to
postpone the switch globally due to insufficient confi-
dence in the interruption of persistent cVDPV2s [9]
(e.g., in the event of detection of large numbers of
cVDPV2 cases in the months leading up to April 2016),
tOPV supply challenges could have become even more
severe and could have resulted in gaps in switch dates
between countries and/or challenges to sufficient tOPV
intensification prior to the revised global switch date.
Even with sufficient tOPV supply, some risk exists that
not all countries or areas within countries can or will ef-
fectively switch at the same time. As of April 2016, in-
sufficient global supplies of IPV present challenges for
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countries in the run up to the switch and the situation
led to some consideration of delaying national switch
dates. Any gaps in switch times represent a concern be-
cause population immunity to transmission will mark-
edly drop fairly rapidly after OPV2 cessation in most
places [3, 10].
IPV use will prevent paralysis in successfully vacci-
nated recipients, but provides only limited intestinal im-
munity, as indicated by clinical trials [10–12] and the
circulation of serotype 1 WPV (WPV1) in Israel without
cases of paralytic polio during 2013–2014 despite high
IPV coverage [13, 14]. The ability of IPV to prevent
transmission depends on the intensity of fecal-oral trans-
mission. In places with moderate to low fecal-oral trans-
mission, IPV-only may provide sufficient population
immunity to transmission to prevent evolution of less
transmissible viruses (e.g., closely related to OPV) to
evolve to cVDPVs, which may explain why Israel de-
tected widespread WPV1 transmission without wide-
spread cVDPV transmission despite likely importation of
OPV viruses from bordering countries that used OPV
[15]. However, in areas at highest risk of cVDPV2 out-
breaks after the switch, characterized by low RI coverage
and intense fecal-oral transmission, IPV use will likely
not significantly increase population immunity to sero-
type 2 transmission or prevent cVDPV2 outbreaks [10].
Thus, after indigenous OPV2-related virus circulation
stops following the switch, immunity levels in popula-
tions could potentially support the transmission of
OPV2-related viruses imported from populations that
still use OPV2 (e.g., across shared borders), even with
use of IPV in RI. Once these OPV2-related viruses can
establish circulation, they could evolve to become
cVDPV2s that cause outbreaks requiring aggressive
mOPV use in outbreak response and threaten the polio
endgame [6, 7].
Given the difficult logistics involved with a tightly-
synchronized global switch, we recognize the opportun-
ity to use modeling to explore the extent to which sub-
optimal synchronization results in potential spread of
OPV2-related viruses among countries that switch from
tOPV to bOPV at different times. Using the global
model, [4] this analysis examines the risks associated
with a non-synchronous switch. We focus on character-
izing the vulnerability of populations to the circulation
of imported OPV2-related viruses and we do not con-
sider the possibility of inadvertent OPV2 use or OPV2
used for outbreak response after the switch [7]. Vulner-
ability depends primarily on population immunity to
transmission [15] and consequently we do not consider
in detail the permeability of borders between popula-
tions or the consequences of importations that lead to
the establishment of ongoing transmission of OPV2-
related viruses, which we leave to future studies.
Methods
The global model [4] integrates a previously developed
deterministic, differential equation-based (DEB) polio-
virus transmission and OPV evolution model [16, 17]
(i.e., the DEB model) with stochastic poliovirus reintro-
ductions after OPV cessation, economic model inputs,
characterization of the global variability in conditions
that affect poliovirus transmission and vaccination im-
pacts, and a global mixing structure that generates polio-
virus exportations to random populations. For this
analysis, we use the DEB model and global variability
characterization, but we do not consider the economics,
stochastic risks, and global mixing structure. Given that
the analysis focuses on vulnerability and does not in-
volve the consequences of any random cross-border ex-
portations or other stochastic events, all model results
presented in this study remain deterministic (i.e., a single
model realization).
Based on an extensive expert review [12, 18, 19] and
model calibration process, [16, 17] the DEB model char-
acterizes eight immunity states associated with maternal
antibodies, IPV vaccination, and live poliovirus (LPV, i.e.,
OPV, OPV-related, VDPV, and WPV) infection, five
stages of waning of immunity to poliovirus transmission,
fecal-oral and oropharyngeal transmission, six infection
stages with varying degrees of infectiousness, serotype
differences in basic reproduction numbers (R0 values,
representing measures of inherent transmissibility of po-
lioviruses in a population defined as the average number
of secondary infections generated by a typical infection
in an entirely susceptible population [20]) and paralysis-
to-infection ratios (PIRs), OPV evolution across 20 re-
version stages, and poliovirus die-out. The immunity
states and multi-stage processes represent conceptual
constructs to approximate the evidence about immunity
to poliovirus transmission, infection, and OPV evolution
[12, 18, 19]. The model produces behavior consistent
with the evidence about WPV incidence and die-out as a
function of vaccine use, secondary OPV spread and
cVDPV emergence or lack thereof, and the age distribu-
tions of cases in 10 actual populations encompassing all
three serotypes and a wide range of conditions related to
poliovirus transmission [14, 16, 17]. The DEB model in-
digenously tracks OPV viruses (stage 0) introduced by
vaccination as they evolve during transmission through
19 subsequent stages with increasing R0 values and PIRs
as long as low population immunity to transmission per-
mits their prevalence to remain above a certain trans-
mission threshold. OPV-related viruses that make it to
the last reversion stage (i.e., stage 19) circulate as fully-
reverted VDPVs with the same assumed R0 and PIR as
homotypic WPVs. Thus, cVDPV emergence within pop-
ulations occurs deterministically in the model and pri-
marily depends on population immunity to transmission.
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The DEB model assumes that all immunity states associ-
ated with IPV vaccination or LPV infection benefit from
permanent protection from paralysis, but that the ability
to asymptomatically participate in transmission varies by
nature of the immunity (i.e., IPV-only vs. LPV or IPV
and LPV) and by waning stage. We express population
immunity to transmission as the proportion of the popu-
lation effectively immune to transmission (EIPM), taking
into account age-heterogeneous mixing and the relative
contribution to transmission of individuals in different
immunity states [21, 22]. The mixing-adjusted net
reproduction number (Rn) represents a closely-related
measure and equals the R0 of a poliovirus strain
(serotype, reversion stage) in a given setting multiplied
by one minus the EIPM [22]. Rn represents the average
number of secondary infections generated by a typical
infection, taking into account both the R0 of the virus
and population immunity to transmission. Given its
normalization by the R0, a threshold value of 1 applies
for Rn (i.e., Rn
* = 1), above which poliovirus strains can es-
tablish or continue circulation and below which imported
or circulating polioviruses will ultimately die out. In con-
trast, the analogous threshold for EIPM (EIP* = 1–1/R0)
depends on the R0 of the virus strain in a given setting.
We take advantage of the comparability of Rn values and
use them for this analysis as measures of the vulnerability
of a population to circulation of different poliovirus
strains. However, we emphasize that a specific Rn value
implies different levels of population immunity to trans-
mission for populations with different R0 values. For ex-
ample, an Rn of 1 in a population with poliovirus
transmissibility characterized with an R0 of 10 corre-
sponds to an EIPM of 0.9 (i.e., 1–1/R0), while it corre-
sponds to an EIPM of only 0.8 in a population with
poliovirus transmissibility characterized with an R0 of 5
(i.e., higher inherent transmissibility necessitates greater
immunity to prevent or stop transmission). Rn changes
over time as a result of seasonality in R0 and changes in
population immunity due to RI, SIAs, exposure to circu-
lating LPVs, population growth, and waning of immunity
to poliovirus transmission.
The global model [4] divides the world into 710 subpop-
ulations of approximately 10 million people (as of 2013)
with characteristics selected to represent the global vari-
ability in transmissibility (i.e., R0 and seasonality, role of
oropharyngeal transmission, strength of age-preferential
mixing), vaccination program quality (i.e., RI coverage and
SIA frequency and quality), and surveillance quality (i.e.,
number of paralytic cases needed to detect an outbreak).
The global model groups the subpopulations into epi-
demiological blocks consisting of 10 preferentially-mixing
subpopulations that share the same World Bank income
level, [23] same historical use of polio vaccines, and simi-
lar R0 values. In the model, the R0 values of all serotypes
and reversion stages in a given population depend directly
on the assumed R0 of WPV1, with WPV2 and WPV3 R0
values equal to 90 % and 80 % of the WPV1 R0 value,
respectively. We use the WPV1 R0 value to represent the
inherent transmissibility of polioviruses and as a proxy for
all conditions that affect poliovirus transmissibility in
different populations (e.g., hygiene and sanitation, popula-
tion density, climate) [4, 16, 24]. Based on RI coverage and
R0 values, the global model assumes simplified SIA sched-
ules for all subpopulations that used OPV only (i.e., no
IPV) for RI as of 2013, which includes 520 subpopulations
in low- and middle-income blocks. From 2010 through
2014, the first annual SIA in subpopulations that conduct
at least 1 per year uses tOPV, while most subsequent an-
nual SIAs use bOPV. From January 1, 2015, the global
model assumes that all blocks introduce at least 1 IPV
dose into their RI schedule and that the world implements
tOPV intensification by using tOPV instead of bOPV in
one or two annual SIAs in all subpopulations that conduct
three or more annual SIAs (corresponding to populations
with less than 90 % RI coverage) to boost population im-
munity to serotype 2 polioviruses before the switch in
April 2016 [4, 5]. Although the switch plan includes a 2-
week window between April 17 and May 1, 2016 for the
switch, our existing global model dates back from before
the specific window became public and assumed that all
countries switch exactly on April 1, 2016 [4]. Thus, for
consistency with analyses of the existing global model re-
sults, we adopt April 1, 2016 instead of the actual 2-week
window as the baseline switch date for all populations that
switch on time.
We perform three sets of analyses. Analysis I reports
the distribution of Rn values as a function of time since
the switch for different reversion stages of OPV2-related
viruses among the 520 subpopulations in the global
model that used OPV-only as of 2013. We consider both
the base case results with tOPV intensification and an
alternative scenario without tOPV intensification that
does not replace some bOPV SIAs with tOPV in the run
up to the switch [4]. We also consider the relationship
between various population-specific model inputs and
the time since the switch until the Rn of OPV2 exceeds
1, as well as the impact of seasonal fluctuations on the
distribution of Rn values of OPV2.
Analysis II explores the relationship between the Rn at
the time of the switch, the time until indigenous OPV2-
related viruses die out, and the time until imported
OPV2-related viruses in different reversion stages can
establish transmission. For this analysis, we use a hypo-
thetical population with setting-specific inputs listed in
the top section of Table 1 reflecting properties approxi-
mately like northern India [4, 9, 25]. However, to focus
the analysis on demonstrating key concepts and control
for the effect of seasonality on die-out and Rn values, we
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do not include seasonal variation in R0. To attain differ-
ent Rn values at the time of the switch, we vary the
switch date to occur at different times after two tOPV
SIAs in early 2015. We conduct the analysis for R0
values of WPV1 of 10 or 13 to examine the effect of R0.
As previously noted, the R0 of WPV1 serves as a proxy
for all conditions that affect transmissibility of all polio-
viruses in different populations, and the model appropri-
ately uses lower relative R0 values for serotype 2.
Analysis III explores the time window of exposure to
OPV2-related viruses as a result of a non-synchronous
switch in realistic populations taken from the global
model. The second section of Table 1 lists the assumed
setting-specific model inputs for these populations.
Unlike the global model mixing structure with blocks of
10 subpopulations each, for this analysis we consider the
simplest case of two populations each consisting of two
equally-sized subpopulations, which may include one
with characteristics typical of an under-vaccinated sub-
population and one with characteristics typical of the
general population [4, 16, 22, 25]. The populations may
represent countries or states that potentially switch at
different times, and we assume subpopulations of the
same population always switch at the same time. We
used a two-population, four-subpopulation model be-
cause it represents the simplest possible structure to
characterize heterogeneity in switch times and popula-
tion immunity.
Part of analysis III considers two populations with high
R0 and under-vaccinated subpopulations (i.e., conditions
similar to northern India and northern Pakistan and
Afghanistan) using assumptions from the global model.
The remainder of analysis III specifically models a situ-
ation with disrupted immunization prior to the switch
(e.g., the Ukraine), for which we assumed several depar-
tures from the global model to accommodate a simpli-
fied vaccination history. Specifically, in an abbreviated
run-up, this Ukraine-like model assumes that RI with
OPV-only started in 1980 and eliminated indigenous
WPVs, 4 SIAs occurred in the late 1990s, and a switch
to an IPV/OPV sequential schedule occurred in 2005
(i.e., 2 doses of IPV followed by 2 doses of tOPV). We
further assume that RI coverage with 3 or more poliovirus
vaccine doses decreases from 90 % everywhere before
2010 to 30 % in under-vaccinated subpopulations and
70 % in the better-vaccinated general population from
Table 1 Setting-specific model inputs for Analyses II and III, adapted from the global model [4] and adopting all other global model
assumptions, including generic inputs from the DEB model.[16, 17]
Region R0 α pd κ tr POL3 TC Prm p







Hypothetical population 10 or 13 0 NA 0.35 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.3 2 2015 Variable after
last SIA in 2015
Analysis III:
Population like northern India 13 0.2 180 0.35 0.6 0.3 2 2015
- Pop. A, subpop. 0 (under-vacc.) 0.3 0.8 0.7 Mid-2015
- Pop. A, subpop. 1 (general) 0.6 0.95 0.5 Mid-2015
- Pop. B, subpop. 0 (under-vacc.) 0.3 0.8 0.7 April 1, 2016
- Pop. B, subpop 1 (general) 0.6 0.95 0.5 April 1, 2016
Population like northern
Pakistan/Afghanistan
11 0.2 180 0.35 0.65 0.3 2015
- Pop. A, subpop. 0 (general) 0.6 0.8 0.7 2 Mid-2015
- Pop. A, subpop. 1 (general) 0.6 0.8 0.7 2 Mid-2015
- Pop. B, subpop. 0 (under-vacc.) 0.1 0.35 0.95 3 April 1, 2016
- Pop. B, subpop 1 (general) 0.6 0.8 0.7 2 April 1, 2016
Population like Ukraine 6 0.4 180 0.45 0.74 0.8 0 2005
- Pop. A, subpop. 0 (general) 0.7a 0.8 0.7 Mid-2015
- Pop. A, subpop. 1 (general) 0.7a 0.8 0.7 Mid-2015
- Pop. B, subpop. 0 (under-vacc.) 0.3 a 0.8 0.7 April 1, 2016
- Pop. B, subpop 1 (under-vacc. ) 0.3a 0.8 0.7 April 1, 2016
Model input symbols: [3, 16] R0 average annual basic reproduction number for WPV of serotype 1, α seasonal amplitude of R0, defined as the “proportional
change in R0 due to seasonality” [16, p. 717], pd peak day of R0, κ strength of preferential mixing between age groups, defined as the “proportion of contacts
reserved for individuals within the same mixing age group”[16, p. 717], tr take rate of serotype 2 tOPV, POL3 RI coverage with 3 or more non-birth doses, TC true
coverage of each SIA, Prm repeated missed probability of each SIA, p
oro, proportion of transmissions via oropharyngeal route
aAssume POL3 = 90 % prior to 2010
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then forward, reflecting deteriorating immunization and
leading to approximately 50 % national coverage and sig-
nificant heterogeneity. We considered a hypothetical
worst case scenario in which the better-vaccinated half of
the population switches prematurely from tOPV to bOPV
in mid-2015 while the under-vaccinated subpopulations
continue to use tOPV until the global switch in April
2016. An alternative scenario for this population delays
the date of IPV introduction to the beginning of 2017, as-
suming a 3-dose OPV-only RI schedule until then. We did
not include the tOPV mop-up activities that apparently
controlled the serotype 1 cVDPV transmission responsible
for 2 detected Ukrainian polio cases in 2015 [26].
Results
Figure 1 shows the results of Analysis I in the form of
selected percentiles from the distribution of Rn values
for the 520 subpopulations in the global model that used
only OPV as of 2013 for OPV2, identical to the parent
vaccine strain (stage 0), partially-reverted OPV2-related
virus in stage 10, and fully-reverted VDPV2 (stage 19).
Fig. 1a suggests that with well-implemented tOPV in-
tensification everywhere ahead of the switch, it takes
over a year for the Rn of OPV2 to exceed 1 in the first
subpopulation, and over 2 years until it exceeds 1 in over
75 % of the subpopulations. Thus, even in the event of
relatively large gaps in switch times, populations that
switch on time sustain high enough expected population
immunity to transmission to prevent established cir-
culation of OPV2 virus imported from populations that
continue to use OPV2. However, continued OPV2 use
implies the existence of partially-reverted OPV2-related
viruses evolved from OPV2 to varying degrees, because
even vaccine recipients can excrete partially-reverted
OPV2-related viruses. This suggests some potential for
OPV2-related viruses in higher reversion stages to circu-
late in the event of a non-synchronous switch. In our
model, some prevalence (i.e., above the transmission
Fig. 1 Analysis I results showing selected percentiles from the distribution of net reproduction numbers (Rn values) for the 520 subpopulations in
the global model [4] that used OPV-only as of 2013 with base case assumptions including tOPV intensification before the tOPV to bOPV switch in
April 2016. a Rn values for OPV2 (stage 0). b Rn values for stage 10 OPV2-related virus. c Rn values for VDPV2 (stage 19)
Duintjer Tebbens et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2016) 16:231 Page 6 of 16
threshold) of partially-reverted OPV2-related viruses up
to stage 10 typically exists in the context of regular
OPV2 use in RI and SIAs that sustain high enough
population immunity to serotype 2 to prevent transmis-
sion and evolution to VDPV2. Figure 1b shows that it
takes well over 6 months after a national switch until
the first subpopulation can support transmission of a
stage 10 OPV2-related virus, assuming adequate tOPV
intensification. Figure 1c shows that fully-reverted
VDPV2 viruses can begin to establish transmission as
early as 50 days after the switch in some subpopulations,
which illustrates the importance of stopping all persist-
ent cVDPV2s prior to OPV2 cessation [27]. Thus, in the
event of indigenous cVDPV2 circulation in a population
that switches later, exported cVDPV2 outbreak viruses
may lead to established circulation in other populations
for differences in switch times as short as 2 months.
Figure 2 shows a variation of Analysis I without tOPV
intensification but all else equal. Failure to intensify
tOPV use in a population reduces the time until OPV2-
related viruses can establish circulation and thus
increases the vulnerability of that population to import-
ation of an OPV2-related virus from a population still
using tOPV in a non-synchronized switch. For example,
the time since the switch until the Rn for stage 10
OPV2-related viruses exceeds 1 in at least one subpopu-
lation decreases from over 6 months with tOPV int-
ensification to less than 100 days without tOPV
intensification. With respect to VDPV2s, the Rn already
exceeds 1 at the time of the switch in one subpopulation
without tOPV intensification, which results in an indi-
genous cVDPV2 outbreak in this subpopulation follow-
ing the switch [4, 7].
Table 2 explores the relationship between population-
specific properties and the time until the Rn of OPV2
(stage 0) virus exceeds 1 for the 520 subpopulations
characterized in Fig. 1 (i.e., base case with tOPV intensi-
fication). The second column of Table 2 reports the
Fig. 2 Analysis I results showing selected percentiles from the distribution of net reproduction numbers (Rn values) for the 520 subpopulations in
the global model [4] that used OPV-only as of 2013 assuming no tOPV intensification before the tOPV to bOPV switch in April 2016. a Rn values
for OPV2 (stage 0). b Rn values for stage 10 OPV2-related virus. c Rn values for VDPV2 (stage 19)
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number of subpopulations for which the time until the
Rn of OPV2 (stage 0) virus exceeds 1 falls into the ranges
shown in the first column. The Rn prior to the switch
(third column) indicates the starting point of vulnerabil-
ity, averaged over a full year before the switch to control
for seasonality, after which the removal of OPV2 from
all immunization activities leads to increased vulnerabil-
ity to any introduction of OPV2 (stage 0) virus. Higher
Rn before the switch generally leads to shorter times
until Rn of OPV2 (stage 0) virus exceeds 1, although the
relationship is imperfect due to other factors that also
influence the time until Rn of OPV2 (stage 0) virus ex-
ceeds 1 (e.g., RI coverage with IPV, the relative contribu-
tion of oropharyngeal transmission (poro), seasonality in
R0). Table 2 shows that subpopulations with high R0
values and little contribution of oropharyngeal transmis-
sion tend to reach an Rn for OPV2 (stage 0) viruses of 1
the soonest. The global model assumes that SIA fre-
quency inversely relates to RI coverage so that SIAs can
close immunity gaps in areas with poor RI coverage.
Consequently, different combinations of RI coverage
values and numbers of tOPV SIAs can produce similar
times until OPV2 exceeds 1. Although subpopulations
with R0 values below 9 typically sustain an Rn of
OPV2 (stage 0) virus below 1 for many years, Table 2
shows two exceptions (i.e., a chronically under-
vaccinated subpopulation with an R0 of 8 that reaches
this point within approximately 2 years and a sub-
optimally vaccinated subpopulation with an R0 of 7
and very strong seasonality that reaches this point
during high seasons within 3 years).
Table 3 shows the relationship between population-
specific properties and the time until the Rn of OPV2
(stage 0) virus exceeds 1 for the 520 subpopulations
characterized in Fig. 2 (i.e., similar to Table 2 except
without tOPV intensification). In general, without tOPV
intensification the time until Rn of OPV2 (stage 0) virus
exceeds 1 decreases (i.e., shorter time, increased risk) for
subpopulations affected by the tOPV intensification
policy (i.e., those with higher R0 values and low RI
coverage), except for the population in which an indi-
genous cVDPV2 emerges because of the failure to inten-
sify tOPV use, which leads to subsequent higher
immunity due to the outbreak and response. Compari-
son of Tables 2 and 3 shows that tOPV intensification
did not affect subpopulations with relatively lower R0
values and higher RI coverage that already only conduct
tOPV SIAs or conduct no SIAs.
The results in Figs. 1 and 2 suggest that the risk of
cVDPV2 outbreaks associated with a non-synchronous
switch will depend on the size of the gap in switch times
because populations will become increasingly vulnerable
to transmission of OPV2-related viruses after the switch.
Given that after the switch RI doses of IPV, which
provides only limited intestinal immunity, [10–12] will
represent the only poliovirus vaccine available for RI for
serotype 2, the tOPV-induced population immunity to
serotype 2 transmission at the time of switch signifi-
cantly affects the time it takes until imported OPV2-
related viruses from subpopulations that still use OPV2
can establish transmission.
Analysis II further illustrates the importance of the
tOPV-induced population immunity to serotype 2 trans-
mission at the time of the switch by showing in Fig. 3
the time until OPV2-related viruses in different rever-
sion stages reach an Rn exceeding 1 as a function of the
Rn of OPV2 (stage 0) at the time of the switch in a hypo-
thetical population with properties provided in Table 1.
The two panels of Fig. 3 show the results with different
inherent R0 values (expressed as R0 values for WPV1)
but all else equal. In the shaded areas, Fig. 3 also shows
the relationship between the Rn of OPV2 at the time of
the switch and the amount of time during which indi-
genous OPV2-related viruses still exist and presumably
represent the primary source of national risk. The Rn
values at the time of the switch on the x-axis start at
0.44 because for the modeled hypothetical population
with a baseline R0 of 13, this represents the lowest Rn
value attainable by tOPV intensification (i.e., shortly
after the last 2 tOPV SIAs). After stopping the use of
tOPV, OPV2-related viruses remain present in the popu-
lation for some time because it takes time until tOPV re-
cipients stop excreting OPV2-related viruses, and some
secondary infections with OPV2-related viruses may
occur as long as the prevalence of at least one reversion
stage remains above the transmission threshold. At the
lowest attainable Rn (0.44), indigenous OPV2-related vi-
ruses die out rapidly within 3 months (Fig. 3a), after
which exposure to any OPV2-related viruses from popu-
lations that did not yet switch represents the only
switch-related risk. Because of the low Rn at the time of
the switch (0.44), it takes approximately 5 months until
imported VDPV2s can establish circulation and approxi-
mately 10 months until stage 10 viruses can establish
circulation in this hypothetical population.
As Rn at the time of the switch increases, the time
until any imported OPV2-related viruses can establish
circulation decreases, but indigenous circulation also
continues for longer because higher Rn values mean that
each OPV2-related virus infection generates more new
infections. Thus, in the shaded area before die-out of in-
digenous OPV2-related viruses, importations due to a
non-synchronous switch present a threat that does not
already exist indigenously only if the populations that
continue OPV2 use for longer than the modeled popula-
tion export more reverted viruses than the indigenous
viruses. For example, for an Rn of 0.54 at the time of the
switch, indigenous circulation of OPV2-related viruses,
Duintjer Tebbens et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2016) 16:231 Page 8 of 16
Table 2 Relationship between the time after the switch until the net reproduction number (Rn) of OPV2 (stage 0) virus exceeds 1,
the Rn of OPV2 (stage 0) virus at the time of the switch, and population-specific properties based on the populations from the global













Properties of subpopulations in range
Average Rn before switch
a R0
b poro tr POL3 # tOPV SIA during intensification (2015–2016) TC
1.5–1.74 16 0.37–0.44 11–13 0.3 0.6–0.7 0.3 6 0.5
0.6 6 0.8
0.9 2 0.8





2–2.24 100 0.36–0.42 8 0.3 0.7 0.05 7 0.15




2.25–2.49 20 0.37 10 0.3 0.7 0.6 4 0.95
0.9 2 0.95
2.5–2.74 20 0.33–0.35 9 0.3 0.65–0.7 0.6 4 0.8
0.9 2 0.8
0.98 0 0.95
2.75–3 30 0.25–0.36 7–9 0.3 0.7 0.3 6 0.5
0.6 4 0.8
0.9 2 0.8
0.8 0.65 0.6 4 0.95




0.5 0.72 0.6 4 0.8
0.8 0.65 0.9 2 0.95
0.98 0 0.95
4–4.99 2 0.29 7 0.5 0.72–0.73 0.6 4 0.8
0.9 2 0.8
5–7.49 30 0.27–0.35 6–8 0.5–0.6 0.73 0.6 4 0.8
0.9 2 0.8–0.95
7.5–9.99 3 0.30 7 0.6 0.73 0.6 4 0.8
10–14.99 16 0.31–0.36 7–8 0.6 0.73–0.74 0.6 4 0.8
0.9 2 0.8–95
0.98 0 0.95
15–19.99 116 0.3–0.37 7–8 0.6 0.73–0.74 0.9 2 0.8
0.98 0 0.95
Duintjer Tebbens et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2016) 16:231 Page 9 of 16
which involves reversion stages 0 through 8 (not shown),
continues for 6 months, during which time only
imported viruses in stage 9 or higher could establish
circulation and pose a larger threat than the indigenous
viruses (Fig. 3a). After indigenous circulation stops,
lower-stage OPV2-related viruses could establish circula-
tion, but importation of these viruses requires a rela-
tively long gap in switch times (i.e., between countries
that switch at different times). For values of Rn for
OPV2 (stage 0) at the time of the switch over 0.54, the
higher Rn values for OPV2-related viruses at higher re-
version stages lead to higher prevalence values of more
reverted OPV2-related viruses that continue to evolve to
even higher reversion stages, allowing a virus to appear
at a reversion stage for which Rn > 1 before all OPV2-
related viruses die out. In the absence of vaccination
with tOPV to sustain population immunity, this results
in an indigenous cVDPV2 outbreak in this modeled
population, which makes the risks associated with non-
synchronous cessation a secondary concern.
Figure 3b shows the impact of changing the baseline
R0 for WPV1 from 13 to 10. As we lower R0, similar Rn
values as in Fig. 3a occur for lower population immunity
to transmission, and thus the x-axis ranges in Figs. 3a
and b represent different levels of population immunity
to transmission at the time of the switch. Figure 3b
shows that indigenous cVDPV2s still emerge above the
same threshold Rn at the time of the switch of approxi-
mately 0.54. Changing the baseline R0 from 13 to 10 in-
creases the time until any imported OPV2-related
viruses can establish transmission, which suggests that
for lower R0 values, relatively longer gaps in switch times
can occur without a significant risk of established circu-
lation from imported OPV2-related viruses.
While Fig. 3 focuses on the relationship between the
Rn at the time of the switch in the potentially importing
populations (i.e., those that switch earlier), it also reveals
the influence of the mix of OPV2-related viruses in the
exporting populations (i.e., those that switch later),
which depends on their population immunity to sero-
type 2 transmission. Analysis III examines the interplay
between importing and exporting populations using
two-population and four-subpopulation models with
realistic properties (Fig. 4). All panels of Fig. 4 show the
highest reversion stage of OPV2-related virus circulating
in each subpopulation (left axis), as well as the Rn values
for the highest reversion stage of OPV2-related viruses
that the population that switches early (i.e., population
A) gets exposed to from the population that switches
late (i.e., population B). The highest reversion stage that
circulates in a population depends on the rate of intro-
duction of OPV2 viruses through tOPV vaccination and
the level of population immunity to transmission. Even
with high population immunity and Rn of OPV2 (stage
0) well below 1, tOPV use during RI and SIAs implies
some prevalence of OPV2 virus above the transmission
threshold, which leads to limited transmission (i.e., less
than 1 infection per new infection on average) and some
evolution to subsequent reversion stages. Thus, with on-
going tOPV use, higher reversion stages can exist at
some level in the model even if they do not lead to amp-
lified transmission and cVDPV2 emergence, which only
occurs for higher Rn values.
Figure 4a models two populations with properties like
northern India, [25] which both include under-vaccinated
subpopulations with sub-optimal RI and SIA quality. The
premature switch in population A approximately 270 days
before population B (Table 1) leads to a similar window
of approximately 250 days during which partially-
reverted viruses exist in population B that no longer
circulate in population A. However, of these 250 days,
the Rn for those viruses exceeds 1 only during the
last 100 days, and their prevalence in population B
remains too low to trigger any exportations to popu-
lation A with the global model assumptions for inter-
population mixing [4].
In Fig. 4b, we modeled the possibility of exposure to
more reverted viruses in a setting like northern Pakistan
and Afghanistan (Table 1) by assuming that the under-
vaccinated subpopulation in population B continues to
use OPV2 after a premature switch in population A. As
shown in Fig. 4a, OPV2-related viruses in elevated stages
of reversion exist in the under-vaccinated subpopulation
of population B and present a risk of exportation to
population A. However, because the very low population
immunity to serotype 2 transmission in the under-
vaccinated subpopulation of population B permits circu-
lation of its own highly-reverted OPV2-related viruses
Table 2 Relationship between the time after the switch until the net reproduction number (Rn) of OPV2 (stage 0) virus exceeds 1,
the Rn of OPV2 (stage 0) virus at the time of the switch, and population-specific properties based on the populations from the global
model [4] represented in the distributions of Fig. 1 (analysis I base case with tOPV intensification) (Continued)
>20 44 0.3–0.35 6–7 0.6–0.8 0.73–0.75 0.9 2 0.95
0.98 0 0.95
Model input symbols: [3, 16] R0 average annual basic reproduction number for WPV of serotype 1, tr take rate of serotype 2 tOPV, POL3 RI coverage with 3 or
more non-birth doses, TC true coverage of each SIA, poro proportion of transmissions via oropharyngeal route
aDefined as the average Rn of OPV2 over the one-year period preceding the switch
bThe global model uses R0 for WPV1 to characterize variability in subpopulations, R0 for serotype 2 WPV equals 0.9 times the values shown in this column
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Table 3 Relationship between the time after the switch until the net reproduction number (Rn) of OPV2 (stage 0) virus exceeds 1,
the Rn of OPV2 (stage 0) virus at the time of the switch, and population-specific properties based on the populations from the global













Properties of subpopulations in range
Average Rn before switch
a R0
b poro tr POL3 # tOPV SIA during 2015–2016 TC









1.75–1.99 30 0.55 8 0.3 0.7 0.05 4 0.15
0.35 9 0.3 0.7 0.6 2 0.8
0.35–0.43 9–12 0.3 0.65–0.7 0.3 4 0.5
0.6 4 0.5–0.95
0.9 2 0.8–0.95




2.25–2.49 10 0.37 10 0.3 0.7 0.9 2 0.95
2.5–2.74 18 0.33–0.38 9 0.3 0.65–0.7 0.9 2 0.8
0.98 0 0.95




0.8 0.65 0.6 2 0.95




0.5 0.72 0.6 2 0.8
0.8 0.9 2 0.95
0.98 0 0.95
0.38c 11 0.3 0.65 0.6 4 0.8
0.53c 11 0.3 0.65 0.1 4 0.35
4–4.99 2 0.29 7 0.5 0.72–0.73 0.6 2 0.8
0.9 2 0.8
5–7.49 30 0.27–0.35 6–8 0.5–0.6 0.73 0.6 2 0.8
0.9 2 0.8–0.95
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even before the switch in population B, an indigenous
cVDPV2 emerges after the switch in the under-
vaccinated subpopulation of population B. Thus, it ap-
pears that for a gap in switch times of less than a year,
an extended period of potential importation of OPV2-
related viruses at a high enough reversion stage to
establish transmission only occurs if a high potential of
indigenous cVDPV2s already exists in the exporting
population.
Figure 4c models the case of a population with sub-
optimal RI coverage that did not conduct tOPV SIAs for
many years, as occurred in the Ukraine. For this mod-
eled temperate setting, we assume much more seasonal
variation in R0 values, which coupled with low RI in
population A (Table 1) results in circulation of OPV2-
related viruses at relatively high reversion stages during
the high season. Figure 4c shows a very long window of
approximately 1.5 years during which the better-
vaccinated subpopulations could import more reverted
viruses from the under-vaccinated subpopulations than
any of its indigenous viruses. This window starts before
the premature switch in population A and continues
through the switch in population B and subsequent long
period of indigenous OPV2-related virus circulation in
population B. However, due to its relatively better RI
coverage, which includes two IPV doses after the switch
in a setting with relatively little fecal-oral transmission,
population A sustains high enough population immunity
to transmission to prevent established circulation of any
of the OPV2-related virus strains circulating in popula-
tion B. Additional analyses showed that as we lower RI
coverage in population B while increasing coverage in
population A to fix the national coverage at 50 %, we
reach the point at which indigenous cVDPV2s emerge
after the switch in population B well before the point at
which population A can establish circulation of any
imported cVDPV2s from population A. If we decrease
coverage in population A while still fixing national
coverage at 50 %, then population A becomes more vul-
nerable to highly-reverted OPV2-related viruses, but
population B no longer creates these viruses. As in the
other settings, it appears that for a gap in switch times
below a year, high vulnerability to imported OPV2-
related viruses only occurs when the potential for indi-
genous cVDPV2s is already very high in the importing
and/or exporting population. Figure 4d shows that with
a (3-dose) OPV-only schedule instead of the sequential
IPV/OPV schedule since 2005, population immunity to
transmission remains somewhat higher before the
switch, leading to circulation of less-reverted OPV2-
related viruses (i.e., highest reversion stage reached of 10
instead of 13). However, after the switch, the absence of
IPV RI results in a more rapid decrease in population
immunity to transmission, higher Rn values for OPV2-
related viruses, and a brief period of vulnerability of
population A to OPV2-related viruses still circulating in
population B.
Discussion
This study expands on prior game theory arguments for
coordinated OPV cessation [27, 28] and demonstrates
increased vulnerability of different populations to im-
portation of OPV2-related polioviruses in the event of a
non-synchronous switch from tOPV to bOPV. Assuming
well-implemented tOPV intensification and, less import-
antly, use of at least a single dose of IPV in RI programs
everywhere, the results overall suggest a time window of
approximately 6 months or more after the switch during
which residual tOPV-induced population immunity to
transmission will prevent imported OPV2-related polio-
viruses that typically circulate in countries that still use
OPV2 [19, 29–31] from establishing circulation. This
Table 3 Relationship between the time after the switch until the net reproduction number (Rn) of OPV2 (stage 0) virus exceeds 1,
the Rn of OPV2 (stage 0) virus at the time of the switch, and population-specific properties based on the populations from the global
model [4] represented in the distributions of Fig. 2 (analysis I without tOPV intensification) (Continued)
7.5–9.99 3 0.30 7 0.6 0.73 0.6 2 0.8
10–14.99 16 0.31–0.36 7–8 0.6 0.73–0.74 0.6 2 0.8
0.9 2 0.8–95
0.98 0 0.95
15–19.99 116 0.3–0.37 7–8 0.6 0.73–0.74 0.9 2 0.8
0.98 0 0.95
>20 44 0.3–0.35 6–7 0.6–0.8 0.73–0.75 0.9 2 0.95
0.98 0 0.95
Model input symbols: [3, 16] R0 average annual basic reproduction number for WPV of serotype 1, tr take rate of serotype 2 tOPV, POL3 RI coverage with 3 or
more non-birth doses, TC true coverage of each SIA, poro proportion of transmissions via oropharyngeal route
aDefined as the average Rn of OPV2 over the one-year period preceding the switch
bThe global model uses R0 for WPV1 to characterize variability in subpopulations, R0 for serotype 2 WPV equals 0.9 times the values shown in this column
cPopulation shows long time until Rn of OPV2 exceeds one because of an indigenous cVDPV2 outbreak in one of its subpopulations following the switch and a
subsequent mOPV2 response
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finite window provides some reassurance that the planned
risk management strategies will reduce vulnerability asso-
ciated with unexpected delays, but overall the analysis
confirms the need to globally-coordinate OPV cessation of
any serotype, [27, 28] as planned [1, 2, 32]. However, a
premature switch in a population with already sub-
optimal population immunity to transmission will shorten
this finite window. A delayed switch in a population with
sub-optimal population immunity to transmission also in-
creases risk because it permits indigenous circulation of
more reverted OPV2-related viruses that could export to
populations that already switched. Thus, failure to inten-
sify tOPV use prior to the switch not only increases the
risk of the creation of indigenous cVDPV2s, [3, 4, 7, 10,
22, 25] but also increases the risk of cVDPV2 outbreaks
associated with a non-synchronous switch. To minimize
the risk of cVDPV2 outbreaks after the switch, this ana-
lysis implies that, regardless of IPV use, all countries
should switch as close as possible to the agreed upon glo-
bal switch date and continue or intensify efforts to main-
tain high population immunity using tOPV up until the
switch. The possibility of a cVDPV2 outbreak due to a fail-
ure to fully synchronize the switch, a failure to eliminate
existing cVDPV2s through intense tOPV use prior to
OPV cessation, [3] or inadvertent tOPV use after the
switch [33] reinforces the need for outbreak response
Fig. 3 Analysis II results showing the relationship between net reproduction number (Rn) at the time of the switch and time until OPV2-related vi-
ruses in different reversion stages can establish circulation (i.e., time until Rn becomes greater than 1) in a hypothetical population (see Table 1)
The shaded areas show the duration of indigenous circulation of OPV2-related viruses following the switch, which continues indefinitely if
cVDPV2s emerge indigenously in the absence of an outbreak response. a Baseline R0 for WPV1 equals 13. b Baseline R0 for WPV1 equals 10
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preparedness and the stockpiling of mOPV2 and any IPV
needed for potential outbreak responses [6, 7].
Our analysis focused on the vulnerability of popula-
tions to imported OPV2-related viruses, which countries
can directly control with their immunization choices
[15]. The degree of cross-border transmission between
any populations that might not switch on the same date
remains uncertain and more difficult to control. The rate
of exportations between communities that share a phys-
ical border may exceed the average values for inter-
population exportations assumed in the global model [4]
and requires further research. In addition, we emphasize
that actual importations represent stochastic events, and
rare events sometimes occur. Given vulnerability to
imported OPV-related viruses, the risks of cross-border
transmission will increase with the size of the popula-
tions that fail to synchronize OPV cessation. While
population immunity to transmission after the switch
depends primarily on population immunity to transmis-
sion at the time of the switch, IPV use during RI will re-
duce the rate of decrease in population immunity to
transmission, particularly in settings with better hygiene
and a lower contribution of fecal-oral versus oropharyn-
geal transmission, but we emphasize that these popula-
tions already represent relatively lower risk populations.
All limitations from the global model [4] and the
DEB model [16, 17] carry over to this analysis. Uncer-
tainty about many model inputs may impact our re-
sults such as the assumed shape of the waning curve,
which affects how fast population immunity to trans-
mission decreases after the switch. The DEB model
also does not model the degree of reversion of OPV-
related viruses at the individual level, which includes
a small fraction (i.e., mathematically, a distributional tail)
of healthy vaccine recipients that excrete VDPVs accord-
ing to the virological definition [34]. While the epidemio-
logical significance of these viruses remains unknown, in
our model the average time to evolve from OPV2 to fully-
reverted VDPV2s with R0 values equal to WPV2 equals
approximately 15 times the average individual excretion
period [17]. If viruses excreted by some fraction of healthy
vaccine recipients represent true VDPVs, then this
Fig. 4 Analysis III results showing examples of non-synchronous switch dynamics in various realistic settings in a two-population, four-subpopulation
model. a Setting like northern India. b Setting like northern Pakistan and Afghanistan. c Setting like Ukraine, assuming IPV use since 2005. d Setting like
Ukraine, assuming no IPV use until 2017
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increases both the indigenous cVDPV2 risk after the
switch and the risk of cVDPV2 associated with a non-
synchronous switch. This analysis also did not consider
the risk of accidental use of tOPV after the switch, which
we considered in our global model only for the first year
after a globally-coordinated switch [4] and subsequently
considered in more detail for specific populations [33].
Any later introductions of OPV2 could establish circula-
tion more easily, and thus successful withdrawal of tOPV
from the field and containment from laboratories remain
critical [33].
Despite these limitations, our work provides support
for efforts to manage the risks associated with the switch
including plans to tightly coordinate the switch across
all countries and the need to ensure sufficient tOPV
supply and use up until the global switch.
Conclusions
Short national discrepancies in the timing of the tOPV
to bOPV switch will likely not significantly increase
cVDPV risks due to the insurance provided by tOPV in-
tensification efforts conducted prior to the switch, al-
though countries should all strive to coordinate their
national switch within the globally agreed April 17-May
1, 2016 time window to minimize the risks associated
with cross-border importations, even in the context of
current limitations in IPV supply.
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